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I. INTRODUCTION
Andre Young lives on McNeil Island, a small, mostly wooded
island about four miles across Puget Sound from Tacoma, Washing-
ton. A six-time rapist,' Young has served time for all his crimes, but
he is not free to leave McNeil Island. This is because Andre Young is
a sexually violent predator, involuntarily committed pursuant to the
Washington State Sexually Violent Predator Statute.
Some form of sexual predator statute exists in every state; some
states require notification and registration, some states allow involun-
tary civil commitment, and some prescribe both notification and com-
mitment.3 Various provenances exist behind these statutes, which
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1. Additional detail is useful for those readers unfamiliar with typical patterns of sexually
violent predators. Young's first series of crimes occurred in 1962, when he broke into the respec-
tive homes of four women and raped them, two at knifepoint. One rape victim was a young
mother whose five-week old baby lay nearby. In 1963, Young was convicted on four counts of
first degree rape. Less than twelve months later, while out on bond, Young exposed himself to a
woman and her child and threatened to rape and kill the woman. He was frightened away and
was never tried for the offense because he was found to be incompetent.
Young was paroled in 1972. Five years later he was again convicted of rape after he broke
into a home and raped a woman. Young was again released in 1980. Following his pattern of
past offenses, in 1985, he broke into the home of a woman. With her three small children near-
by, Young raped the mother, and was again convicted.
Prior to his release for this last crime, the State of Washington petitioned to have Young civ-
illy committed pursuant to Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute. On March 8, 1991,
following the procedural dictates of the statute, a jury unanimously found that Young was a
sexually violent predator. See In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 13-16, 857 P.2d 989, 994-95 (1993).
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09 et seq. (1994 & Supp. 1995).
3. See generally Tom Prettyman, Note, Federal and State Constitutional Law Challenges to
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have been discussed in detail by other commentators.4 These laws,
regardless of the state or exact statute, are frequently challenged on
double jeopardy grounds. The functional premise is simple: a person
has served his sentence for his crime. This sexual predator statute,
whether committing the person or requiring him to register with law
enforcement, inflicts punishment for a second time. In other words,
the challenge to these laws is that they inflict multiple punishments for
the same crime in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
United States Constitution.5 What is not simple, however, is the way
courts determine whether a statute inflicts unconstitutional punish-
ment for a second time in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In Hudson v. United States,6 the United States Supreme Court
discussed the test used to determine whether a statute is criminally
punitive or nonpunitive for double jeopardy purposes.' An in-depth
analysis of the Supreme Court's logic appears later in this Comment,
but what is important at this point is that the Hudson Court specifi-
cally overruled the Supreme Court's prior decision in United States v.
Halper.8 In Halper, the Supreme Court departed from precedent and
determined the punitive/nonpunitive nature of a statute (whether it
inflicts punishment or not) by examining how the statute was applied
to the defendant in that case.9 In other words, the Halper court held
that the statute was punitive, not because of the purpose or language
of the statute itself, but because of how it was specifically applied to
the defendant in that case. This approach to the punitive/nonpunitive
inquiry is dependent on the facts of a specific case. The facts of each
case describe how a statute is being applied, and therefore, whether a
State Sex Offender Laws, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 1075 (1998).
4. See id. at 1075-76; see also Eli M. Rollman, "Mental Illness": A Sexually Violent Preda-
tor Is Punished Twice for One Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 986-90 (1998)
(detailing the history of Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Statute); Adam D. Hirtz, Note, Lock
'em Up and Throw Away the Key: Supreme Court Upholds Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act
in Kansas v. Hendricks, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 545, 545-52 (1998) (giving a brief description of
the historical origins of sexual predator statutes); Nathaniel L. Taylor, Note, Abuse of Judicial
Review: The Unwarranted Demise of the Sexually Violent Predators Statute by Young v. Weston,
71 WASH. L. REv. 543 (1996) (detailing the history of the Washington Sexually Violent Preda-
tor Statute and its application to Young). For a more in-depth analysis of Washington's Sexually
Violent Predator Statute, including its history, see Symposium, Predators and Politics: A Sympo-
sium on Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525
(1992).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. Hudson v. United States 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
7. Id. at 99-100 (listing the seven-factor Kennedy "guideposts" and citing Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)).
8. Id. at 101 ("We believe that Halper's deviation from longstanding double jeopardy prin-
ciples was ill considered.").
9. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-52 (1989).
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statute is punitive. This is an "as applied" double jeopardy approach;
as applied to the defendant, is this statute punitive?
Hudson specifically overruled Halper1° by mandating that the
punitive/nonpunitive nature of a statute be determined solely by ana-
lyzing the statute on its face," and not as applied to the defendant.
12
In other words, the facts of the specific case are irrelevant to the puni-
tive/nonpunitive inquiry, and instead the analysis focuses on the
words and purposes of the statute itself. This is an "on its face" dou-
ble jeopardy approach.
It is important to reemphasize what these approaches determine.
They do not decide whether an act by a governmental agency or actor
is punitive or nonpunitive. Rather, the two double jeopardy ap-
proaches determine the nature of the statute itself. The analysis turns
on whether the statute is punitive, not whether certain actors carrying
out the statute are acting punitively. If the latter were the case, a
plaintiff's claim would be asserted against an actor for misusing the
statute. 3 If the former, the claim would ask the court to find that the
statute itself is punitive, and thus in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause when applied to a defendant who has already been punished.
It is the punitive or nonpunitive nature of a statute that both the as
applied and on its face approaches determine.
Though the Court in Hudson attempted to settle the question
regarding which of the two approaches to take, controversy remains,
which leads us back to Andre Young. In 1995, Young petitioned the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
for a writ of habeas corpus. 4 His case has subsequently been heard by
the Ninth Circuit twice, i s and in a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit
held that, for Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto purposes, an exami-
nation of "the conditions of Young's confinement" would determine
the punitive/nonpunitive nature of the Washington State Sexually
Violent Predator Statute. 6 The examination of the conditions of con-
10. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96.
11. Id. at 104.
12. Id. at 101-02.
13. Usually, these types of claims are made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
14. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 745 (W.D. Wash. 1995). Young challenged the
Washington Sexual Predator Statute, RCW § 71.09, on the grounds that it violated his substan-
tive due process rights, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 748.
It is important to remember that Young challenged the statute itself, not certain government
actors' implementation of the statute. See id. at 748 ("Young asserts that the Statute is uncon-
stitutional on a variety of grounds.") (emphasis added).
15. Young v. Weston, 176 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1999); Young v. Weston, 122 F.3d 38 (9th
Cir. 1997).
16. Young, 176F.3dat 1199.
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finement are an expedition into the specific facts of the case, and thus
the as applied approach, extinguished by Hudson, has been rekindled
by the Ninth Circuit in the Young decision.
Though rekindled, the as applied fire did not spread. Soon after
the Young decision was announced, the Washington State Supreme
Court considered the same sexual predator law that was addressed by
the Ninth Circuit in Young. In both In re Detention of Turay,17 and In
re Detention of Campbell,'" sexual predators who were involuntarily
committed brought personal restraint petitions (the Washington
equivalent of a writ of habeas corpus) to the Washington State
Supreme Court, claiming the Washington State Sexually Violent
Predator Statute violated their individual double jeopardy rights. 9
Thus, the Washington State Supreme Court was faced with the same
question the Ninth Circuit faced in Young: is the statute punitive or
nonpunitive? The Washington State Supreme Court did not follow
the Young court's departure from Hudson. Instead, the Turay and
Campbell courts insisted that the on its face approach is the proper
way to determine the punitive/nonpunitive nature of a statute, and
thus determine if the statute violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.20
17. In re Detention of Turay, 139 Wash. 2d 379, 986 P.2d 790 (1999). Richard Turay, like
Andre Young, has been an active litigant. He brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the offi-
cials who run Washington State's Special Commitment Center (SCC), which houses those com-
mitted under Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute. The SCC was previously located
in Monroe, Washington, but has since been moved to McNeil Island, where there is also a
Washington State Prison. In fact, the SCC is physically incorporated within the prison, though
the SCC block and committees are kept separate from the prisoners. This physical link with the
prison is clearly one of the main reasons that, at least on the level of perception, people view the
SCC as a penal facility, not a treatment facility.
In fact, the poor quality of treatment gives rise to much of the criticism against the SCC; so
much so that Turay's federal suit succeeded, and an injunction was issued against the SCC man-
dating that adequate treatment be provided. See Turay v. Weston, No. C91-664WD (W.D.
Wash. 1994). As will be discussed in section III of this Comment, injunctive relief against an
official for a constitutional violation is much more compatible with separation of powers princi-
ples than a declaration by a court that a law itself is unconstitutionally punitive and thus cannot
be applied to an individual at all.
18. In re Detention of Campbell, 139 Wash. 2d 341, 986 P.2d 771 (1999).
19. Turay, 139 Wash. 2d at 384, 986 P.2d at 793; Campbell, 139 Wash. 2d at 345-46, 986
P.2d at 772-73.
20. See Turay, 139 Wash. 2d at 418-19, 986 P.2d at 811; Campbell, 139 Wash. 2d at 348,
986 P.2d at 775. Although both decisions held that the on its face approach was the proper
analysis to use, both decisions also did an as applied analysis of the statute in question. See
Turay, 139 Wash. 2d at 421, 986 P.2d at 812 ("Assuming arguendo, however, that the Ninth
Circuit is correct that a person committed as an SVP under RCW 71.09 may challenge that stat-
ute as violative of double jeopardy 'as applied to them,' rather than facially, Turay's claim would
still be unsuccessful."); Campbell, 139 Wash. 2d at 348-49, 986 P.2d at 775 ("Even assuming
Campbell may properly challenge the validity of his order of commitment based upon the condi-
tions of confinement at the SCC,... Campbell has failed to prove the conditions of confinement
are punitive, so as to render the statute unconstitutional as applied to him."). The motives
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The Turay court (on which Campbell relied for its analysis21) noted the
Young court's decision to use an as applied approach, but expressly
declined to follow the Ninth Circuit on this issue.22
Campbell and Turay's refusal to follow Young created a conflict
between the Washington State Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit.
With this conflict looming, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to Washington State's appeal of the Young decision. 23 The
case will be heard in the 2000-2001 term, and it presents a prime
opportunity for the United States Supreme Court to specifically
articulate why an as applied approach is impermissible.
This Comment will argue that an as applied approach allows the
executive branch, whether at the state or federal level, to encroach into
the legislative realm by rendering a statute unconstitutional as a result
of the way the statute is administered. An as applied approach allows
an otherwise constitutional statute to be robbed of its constitutionality
solely by the dictates of the executive branch. This kind of as applied
veto violates the separation of powers principles that underpin the fed-
eral, and many state, constitutions. In other words, an as applied
approach allows the executive branch to undermine the constitution-
ality of a law by administering it in an unconstitutional way. Instead
of holding the executive branch responsible for its actions, an as
applied approach shifts the blame to the statute itself and holds that
the statute is unconstitutionally punitive. Thus, an as applied
approach extends the executive power to invalidate laws beyond its
normal veto power. The United States Supreme Court should there-
fore use Young to reject as applied approaches in the double jeopardy
context.
Reaching this conclusion, however, will require several analytical
steps. Section II of this Comment will begin by examining the history
of the as applied and on its face double jeopardy approaches during
the last 20 years. After a close examination of the decisions in Halper
and Hudson in sections II.B and II.C, this Comment will explain why
the holding of Hudson, though correct in its result, was not based on
sound reasoning. In section II.D, this Comment will examine the
Young decision and its departure from the mandates of Hudson. With
behind these technically unnecessary analyses seem fairly obvious. The Washington State
Supreme Court wanted to ensure that its holdings would survive an affirmance of the Young
decision by the United States Supreme Court.
21. See Campbell, 139 Wash. 2d at 348-49, 986 P.2d at 775.
22. See Turay, 139 Wash. 2d at 419, 986 P.2d at 811-12. The Turay court not only relied
on Hudson for the proposition that a statute needs to be analyzed on its face for double jeopardy
purposes, but also cited its prior decision in Winchester v. Stein, 135 Wash. 2d 835, 959 P.2d
1077 (1998). Turay, 139 Wash. 2d at 417, 986 P.2d at 810.
23. Seling v. Young, 120 S. Ct. 1416 (2000).
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the Ninth Circuit's holding in Young in direct conflict with the Wash-
ington State Supreme Court's holdings in Cambpell and Turay, section
III will argue that the United States Supreme Court should overturn
Young on separation of powers grounds. Finally, section III will also
address the differences between an as applied challenge in the double
jeopardy context and an as applied challenge in other constitutional
contexts.
II. WHAT IS PUNISHMENT FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY PURPOSES?-
RECENT HISTORY
A. Pre Halper Formulations
The Double Jeopardy Clause states: "nor shall any person be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb."24 The United States Supreme Court has held that this clause
protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the
same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same of-
fense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same
offense.25 In the first two instances, it is assumed that the "prosecu-
tion" in a criminal context is the pursuit of a criminal sanction (pun-
ishment). However, for purposes of this Comment, it is the third type
of abuse, multiple punishments, that is of import, for this last abuse is
where the question of what is punishment becomes dispositive. The
United States Supreme Court has also limited the Double Jeopardy
Clause's protections against multiple punishments to criminal, rather
than civil, punishments.26
The first major case of the last 20 years affecting double jeopardy
jurisprudence is United States v. Ward,27 which yielded what has come
to be known as the "Ward test. ' 2' This test determines whether a
statute imposes a civil (nonpunitive) or criminal (punitive) penalty.
The first part of the Ward test examines if the legislature, "in estab-
lishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impli-
edly a preference for one label [civil or criminal] or the other. 29 If the
legislature intended to establish a civil penalty,3" the second part of the
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
25. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
26. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
27. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). The significance of Ward is not that it
was a double jeopardy case because, in fact, it was not, but rather that Ward lays out the founda-
tions for distinguishing a civil and criminal penalty. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49.
28. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104.
29. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
30. Obviously, if the legislature intended a criminal penalty, then the statute is punitive for
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test determines "whether the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either
in purpose or effect" as to render the statute a criminal penalty regard-
less of the legislative label.31 In regard to the second step of the
inquiry, the statute can only be ruled a criminal penalty if the "clearest
proof' exists that the statute is criminally punitive.
32
Though the phrase "purpose or effect" seems to indicate that the
actual "effects" of a statute on a particular individual may be analyzed
and, thus, an as applied approach may be permissible, the history of
that language reveals it is firmly and exclusively rooted in an on its face
approach. The phrase, purpose or effect, is a paraphrase33 of the
United States Supreme Court's prior analysis in Flemming v. Nestor. 4
In Flemming, the Court examined whether a statute's purpose was civil
or criminal, and the analysis only considered the implications (i.e.,
purposes and effects) of the statute on its face.35 Nowhere in Flem-
ming's analysis regarding the criminal or civil nature of the statute in
question did the Court address the actual consequences that flowed
from the application of the statute to the plaintiff in that case.36 The
purposes and effects of the statute were strictly examined on the face
of the statute. 37 This approach was carried forward in the Ward deci-
sion.
In Ward, the Court specified how to determine the purposes and
effects of a statute. The Ward Court noted that, while not dispositive,
the seven factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez38 are helpful
in determining whether a statute is criminally punitive.39 These fac-
tors are: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
double jeopardy purposes.
31. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49.
32. The reasons for this high standard are articulated in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
(1960). First, as the Flemming Court stated, "[j]udicial inquiries into Congressional motives are
at best a hazardous matter, and when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective manifestations it
becomes a dubious affair indeed." Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617. This quote is squarely focused on
the realization that courts are limited in their institutional capacity to reexamine the nature of
congressional enactments. Second, the Court noted "the presumption of constitutionality with
which this enactment, like any other, comes to us forbids us lightly to choose that reading of the
statute's setting which will invalidate it over that which will save it. It is not on slight implica-
tion and vague conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers,
and its acts to be considered as void." Id. at 617 (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810)).
This second reason, instead of focusing on the limitation of the courts' capacity, focuses on the
powers given to the legislature and the just deference the courts give it. Both reasons support the
"clearest proof" standard.
33. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.




38. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
39. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249-50.
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restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4)
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment,
retribution, and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which
it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned."°
All of the above seven factors consider the purposes or effects of
a statute on its face, not on the conditions or results it creates for an
individual. In fact, the Kennedy Court specifically mandated that
"these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its
face. "41
Though the phrase "purpose or effect" is clearly rooted in on its
face precedent, there is still something counterintuitive about saying
that the effects of a statute need to be determined by looking at a stat-
ute on its face. Indeed, reading the phrase "purpose or effect" seems
to suggest deference to the statute on its face (purpose) and as applied
(effects). One might even argue that a strictly on its face analysis bla-
tantly ignores the effects of a statute. However, as shown above in the
discussion of Flemming, Ward, and Kennedy, the phrase "purpose or
effect," comes from an on its face analysis.
Yet, the question remains as to how to examine the effects of a
statute on the face of the statute. It must be remembered that the
motivation behind this second part of the Ward test is to make sure
that, even when the legislature has labeled a statute civil, the statute is
truly civil in nature. Essentially, the court is trying to protect against a
legislature labeling what is really a criminal statute as a civil statute.
Therefore, the effects considered in this analysis are the sanctions a
statute would impose in general, and whether those effects connote a
criminal or civil penalty.
For example, imagine a statute that mandates a 30-day minimum
jail sentence for anyone who infringes a patent. Also, imagine that the
legislature has written a preamble to this statute stating that the stat-
ute is intended to be civil and nonpunitive. From the first part of the
Ward test, we know that the legislature has intended (or has at least
stated) that the statute is civil. The next step is to examine the pur-
poses and effects of the statute, and thus we look to the seven Kennedy
factors. The statute's effect is to put violators in affirmative restraint,
and, therefore, the first Kennedy factor weighs in favor of a finding
that the statute is punitive. The effect of restraint has been histori-
40. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
41. Id. at 169.
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cally regarded as punishment, and as a result, the second factor weighs
like the first. Similarly, the fourth and seventh factors weigh in favor
of finding that the statute is punitive.
Whether this provides the clearest prootC2 necessary to override
the legislature's intent is the end question, but this hypothetical is
meant to show not what the result is, but rather to demonstrate how a
court examines the effects of a statute on its face. A court, using the
Kennedy factors, looks at the effects in a general sense-in other
words, it examines the effects of the statutory scheme, not the specific
effects of a statute on an individual. In fact, the Kennedy factors lend
themselves to an on its face approach when determining effects, not to
a consideration of a statute's actual effect on an individual. Thus,
despite the presumptive meaning of the word "effects," a closer look at
the history behind the phrase and how it is used with the Kennedy
factors supports the conclusion that determining the purposes and
effects of a statute is strictly an on its face analysis.
In sum, the Ward test determines the criminal or civil nature of a
statute, and accordingly determines the constitutional protections that
flow from an application of the statute. The first part of the test,
finding congressional intent as to the nature of the statute, is undenia-
bly an on its face analysis. It in no way relates to the consequences a
statute has on a particular individual. The second part of the test, the
purposes or effects of the statute, at first glance, seems to suggest that
what happens to an individual is relevant in determining the effects of
a statute. But, a careful reading of the source of that phrase, as well as
the tools the United States Supreme Court uses to specify and analyze
it, mandate just one conclusion: that determining the purposes or
effects of a statute requires an on its face analysis.43 This was the state
of the law before the Halper decision.44
42. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
43. In fact, considering that the purpose and effects test is part of a larger two part test,
only the on its face approach makes sense. The first part of the Ward test is specifically limited
to what Congress intended. The second part is meant to ensure that the nature of the law follows
this congressional intent. If the purpose and effect of a statute was considered part of an as
applied approach, it would not be necessary to relate back to the first part of the test at all;
regardless of congressional intent, a statute would be punitive if it were carried out punitively.
An as applied approach under the second part of the Ward test makes this second inquiry an
entirely separate test, thus, the context of purpose and effects within the Ward test lends even
more weight to the conclusion that this analysis is to be done exclusively on the face of the stat-
ute.
44. U.S. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365-66 (1984).
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B. Halper: The "As Applied" Approach Emerges
Ironically, Halper was a unanimous decision,4" and yet, only nine
years later, it was specifically disavowed in Hudson.46 In Halper, the
defendant, Irwin Halper, was a manager of a medical service com-
pany.g7 Halper had submitted 65 false Medicare claims that over-
charged the federal government a total of $585.48 Halper was crim-
inally convicted for making false claims and for mail fraud. He was
sentenced to two years imprisonment and fined $5,000. 4 ' The federal
government then brought another action against Halper, this time for
a violation of the civil False Claims Act."0 The government was
granted summary judgment on the issue of Halper's liability, and the
district court then turned its attention to damages.
The civil False Claims Act mandates a penalty of $2,000 for each
violation."s Thus, for Halper's 65 violations, the fine was in excess of
$130,000.2 The district court, however, refused to apply the total fine
because it concluded that, in combination with the criminal punish-
ment, the fine would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.53 Instead,
the district court read the penalty provision of the False Claims Act as
discretionary and imposed the full sanction for only eight of the 65
counts, resulting in a total fine of $16,000. s4 The government was
granted a rehearing by the district court, but the district court
amended its judgment to further limit the government's recovery to
double damages of $1,170. The government appealed directly to the
United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.56
Relying on Ward, as well as other cases, the Government
7
argued that the nature of a statute is an issue of statutory construction,
and since this statute was intended to be civil, it could not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause." The Halper Court examined these prior
45. Halper, 490 U.S. at 436.
46. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96.
47. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438. The False Claims Act is located at 31 U.S.C. § 3729-3732.
51. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994).
52. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438.
53. Id. at 438-39 (citing Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
54. Id. at 439 (citing United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. at 534).
55. Id. at 439-40 (citing United States v. Halper, 664 F. Supp. 852, 853-55 (S.D.N.Y.
1987)).
56. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440.
57. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex Tel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). See Halper, 490 U.S. at
441.
58. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441-42.
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cases and concluded they did not foreclose a civil penalty from being
criminally punitive when the penalty is "so extreme and so divorced
from the government's damages and expenses." 9 After its historical
analysis, the Halper Court distinguished its decision from the rationale
of Ward. The Court noted that Ward was a Sixth Amendment case,
not a double jeopardy case.6" The Court then held that statutory con-
struction (on its face) analysis is proper for determining constitutional
safeguards in proceedings, but it noted this approach is not well suited
in the context of determining the "human interests" that the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects.61 The Court stated:
This constitutional protection is intrinsically personal. Its vio-
lation can be identified only by assessing the character of the
actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the
state.62
The modern as applied double jeopardy approach was born.
The Court specified further that when a civil sanction as applied
to an individual serves the goals of punishment, i.e., retribution and
deterrence, as opposed to a "remedial" purpose, it constitutes punish-
ment.63 The Halper Court, perhaps in an attempt to mitigate the
changes made to double jeopardy jurisprudence, did limit its holding
to what it called a "rare case," where the civil sanction was "over-
whelmingly disproportionate" and not "rationally related" to the ac-
tual damage caused to the government.64
The new rule announced in Halper, that the Double Jeopardy
Clause's protections could be invoked where a statute is punitive as
applied to an individual, stood for nine years, until the decision in
Hudson. The Halper decision did not however, stand unassailed by
legal commentators. Although some thought the decision correctly
59. Id. at 442.
60. Id. at 447.
61. Id. at 447 (quoting Hess, 317 U.S. at 554 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
62. Id. at 447 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
63. Id. at 448.
64. Id. at 449
We cast no shadow on these time-honored judgments. What we announce now is a
rule for the rare case, the case such as the one before us, where a fixed-penalty provi-
sion subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly dispro-
portionate to the damages he has caused. The rule is one of reason: where a
defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought in
the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the
Government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as 'punishment' in the plain
meaning of the word, then the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Govern-




Seattle University Law Review
focused on the protection of the individual against the government, 65
66most commentary was negative.
The first criticism of the Halper decision was doctrinal. The
Halper Court ignored a consistent line of cases that laid out the proce-
dure for determining the punitive/nonpunitive nature of a statute.67
The second major criticism was that the Halper Court misapplied the
prohibition against multiple punishments. 68  Specifically, before Hal-
per, only second criminal punishments were prohibited, and thus only
prosecutors and courts were limited by the prohibition against multi-
ple punishments. However, after Halper, legislatures were limited in
their ability to pass civil penalties because, if those penalties were
punitive against an individual, they would violate the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause as to that individual.69 Though there were other criti-
cisms of Halper,7° these two are the most significant for our purposes.
The first one led to the decision in Hudson, but, as this Comment will
explain, it is a derivation of the second criticism that leads to the thesis
of this article and to what should have been the basis of Hudson: that
the as applied approach adopted in Halper is unconstitutional because
it allows the executive branch to dictate the constitutionality of an
otherwise valid statute through its implementation of the statute.
65. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Crim-
inal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42
HASTINGS L. J. 1325 (1991).
66. Robin W. Sardegna, No Longer in Jeopardy: The Impact of Hudson v. United States on
the Constitutional Validity of Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of the Securities Laws Under
the Double Jeopardy Clause, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 115, 133 -137 (1998).
67. Id. (citing Linda S. Eads, Separating Crime from Punishment: The Constitutional Impli-
cations of United States v. Halper, 68 WASH. U. L.Q 929 (1990)).
68. Id. at 134-35.
69. Id. (citing Peter Michael Bryce, Note, Second Thoughts on Punishments: Redefining the
Multiple Punishments Prohibition, 50 VAND. L. REV. 167, 177 (1997)).
70. These other criticisms are described by Sardenga. Though important to other issues,
they were delegated to this footnote because they do not bear on the rest of the analysis presented
in this Comment. In addition to the two criticisms listed infra, Sardenga cites four other criti-
cisms of Halper. First, the Halper Court failed to recognize that civil penalties also serve a strong
deterrence purpose, which historically has not changed a statute from civil to criminal. Id. at 135
(citing Eads, supra note 71, at 932). Second, the Halper decision put more of a burden on the
government to administer between its civil and criminal enforcement departments. Id. at 135-36
(citing Lynn C. Hall, Note, Crossing the Line Between Rough Remedial Justice and Prohibited Pun-
ishment: Civil Penalty Violates the Double Jeopardy Clause-United States v. Halper, 109 S. Ct.
1892 (1989), 65 WASH. L. REV. 437, 445 (1990)). Third, the Halper decision promoted strong
judicial activism, without much guidance, at the trial court level, because it mandated that trial
courts sift through the purposes and as applied effects of specific instances of enforcement. Id. at
136 (citing Eads, supra note 65, at 932). Finally, Sardenga criticized Halper for allowing "bad
facts" to make "bad law" through a process which devalued prior double jeopardy precedents.
Id. at 138.
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C. Hudson: A Reversion Back to an On Its Face Analysis
The Hudson decision could not have been a clearer rejection of
Halper. The Hudson Court "disavowed" Halper and "reaffirmed" the
rule of Ward in the first paragraph of the opinion." The order of the
pertinent facts in Hudson is slightly different from those in Halper. In
Hudson, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) civilly
fined three defendants for violations of various federal banking laws.72
The defendants entered into a stipulation with the OCC, agreeing to
fines significantly less than those originally assessed and agreeing not
to participate in the banking industry in any manner.73 Three years
later, based upon the same conduct that led to the fines by the OCC,
all three defendants were indicted in federal court on 22 counts of con-
spiracy and various other charges.74
The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeop-
ardy grounds, but the district court denied the motion.75 The defen-
dants appealed, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held the
nonparticipation provision of the stipulation did not raise double jeop-
ardy concerns, but that the fines could possibly violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The appeals court remanded that part of the case."
On remand, the district court granted the defendants' motions to
dismiss the indictment.77 The court of appeals reversed, holding that
under the Halper analysis, the fines imposed were not so dispropor-
tionate to the damages as to constitute punishment.7" The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari "because of concerns about
the wide variety of novel double jeopardy claims spawned in the wake
of Halper. "'"
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis by restating
the two-step rule from Ward and reemphasizing that the Kennedy fac-
tors, which are used to find the purpose or effect of a statute, are to be
applied by examining a statute on its face. ° The Court went on to
describe two ways in which the Halper decision deviated from past
double jeopardy principles. First, the Court stated that the Halper
Court bypassed the "threshold" question of whether the statute in
71. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 95-96.
72. Id. at 96-97.
73. Id. at 97.
74. Id. at 97-98.





80. Id. at 98-99.
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question was civil or criminal.81 The Hudson Court criticized Halper
for bypassing this question and instead just determining whether the
sanction in question was excessive in relation to harm caused.82 The
Hudson Court characterized this action as elevating a single Kennedy
factor, (whether the sanction appears excessive in relation to the other
alternative purpose assigned),83 to a dispositive status.84 The second
ground for the Court's criticism of Halper was that Halper used an as
applied analysis of the sanction imposed instead of examining the
statute on its face, as Kennedy commands.8"
Having identified the two doctrinal departures made by the Hal-
per Court, the Hudson Court characterized the Halper approach as "ill
considered."86  The Court then gave three reasons, apart from the
aforementioned jumbling of prior jurisprudence, why the Halper as
applied approach was not the appropriate method of analysis for deter-
mining what constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
The first reason the Hudson Court gave was that, "[a]s subse-
quent cases have demonstrated, Halper's test ... has proved unwork-
able."87  This refers to Halper's conclusion that if a civil sanction
serves the goals of punishment, retribution, and deterrence, the sanc-
tion is punitive for double jeopardy purposes.88 The Hudson Court
noted that in cases subsequent to Halper, the United States Supreme
Court had recognized that all civil penalties serve the purpose of
deterrence.89 Since all civil penalties serve some purposes of punish-
ment, the Hudson Court reasoned that under the Halper test, all civil
penalties would be subject to double jeopardy limitations.9"
Though it may be true that Halper's test is unworkable, in light
of history, this is a perplexing comment by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who wrote the majority opinion in Hudson.9 Only one year earlier, in
United States v. Ursery,92 the Chief Justice, again writing for the ma-
jority, specifically disavowed a reading of Halper that suggested that






87. Id. at 101-02.
88. Id. at 101.
89. Id. at 102 (citing Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 777,
n. 14 (1994); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 284-85, n. 2 (1996)).
90. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 102.
91. Id. at 95.
92. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
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only remedial, and not punitive, civil sanctions could survive a double
jeopardy challenge.93
In his dissent in Ursery, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for
not following the general rule of Halper that, if a civil sanction serves
any purpose of punishment and is not solely remedial, it can be fairly
characterized as punishment.94 Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for
the majority in Ursery, wrote that Justice Stevens' interpretation of
Halper was "both contrary to the decision itself and would create an
unworkable rule inconsistent with well-established precedent."95 Yet,
just one year later in Hudson, Justice Rehnquist and the majority
adopted Stevens' reading of Halper and used it to conclude that the
rule in Halper was unworkable.96 While this inconsistency is not fatal
to the holding,97 it does point to a weakness in the Hudson Court's rea-
soning when considering past precedent, and thus weakens the credi-
bility of the Court on this first rationale for disavowing Halper.
The Hudson Court's second attack on the Halper decision was
that the Halper Court improperly looked to the sanctions actually
imposed by the statute. In other words, Halper used an as applied
approach.9" While the Hudson Court chose the right target by attack-
ing this issue, it used the wrong gun. The Hudson Court essentially
made a procedural argument: with an as applied approach, when a
civil sanction follows a criminal sanction, a court will not be able to
determine whether the civil sanction is punitive until after the sanction
has been imposed, which means after the civil proceeding. According
to the Hudson Court, this goes against the notion that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prevents the government from even "attempting a
second time to punish criminally."' While this argument is valid, it
invites misinterpretation, and, as pointed out by Justice Stevens in his
concurrence, it is irrelevant to the outcome of Hudson because in that
93. Id. at 284, n.2. For specific discussions of the ramifications and reasons behind the
Ursery decision, see Sean M. Dunn, Note, United States v. Ursery: Drug Offenders Forfeit Their
Fifth Amendment Rights, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1207 (1997); Patrick S. Nolan, Comment, Double
Jeopardy's Multipunishment Protection and Regulation of Civil Sanctions After United States v.
Ursery, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1081 (1997); J. Andrew Vines, Note, United States v. Ursery: The
Supreme Court Refuses to Extend Double Jeopardy Protection to Civil In Rem Forfeiture, 50 ARK.
L. REV. 797 (1998).
94. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 306 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 284, n.2.
96. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101-02.
97. In fact, Justice Stevens raised this point in his concurrence. "Having just recently
emphasized Halper's narrow rule in Urseiy, it is quite odd for the Court now to suggest that its
overbreadth has created some sort of judicial emergency." Id. at 109 (Stevens, J., concurring).
98. See id. at 101.
99. Id. at 102 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1988)).
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case the criminal prosecution occurred after the civil sanction) °0 Also,
does the fact that a civil sanction occurs before a criminal sanction
make an as applied approach permissible because the problem illumi-
nated in Hudson is no longer applicable? From the explicit holding of
Hudson the answer is no,1"i but as will be explained, a more profound
reason exists for disallowing an as applied approach than just the
chronological and procedural aspects of double jeopardy, which may
or may not apply to a certain set of circumstances.
The Hudson Court's last attack on Halper was that the concerns
raised in Halper, that the remedy involved was not rationally con-
nected to the damages incurred by the government, are addressed by
other constitutional provisions." 2 The Court cited the Due Process
Clause"0 3 and the Equal Protection Clause' 4 as protecting individuals
from irrational sanctions. °' The Hudson Court also cited the Eighth
Amendment"' as protecting individuals against excessive fines.i07
The Hudson Court concluded that because these protections are in
place, any additional protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause is "more than offset by the confusion created by attempting to
distinguish between punitive and nonpunitive penalties." 'is
There are two major problems with this last attack on Halper by
the Hudson Court. First, the analysis focuses on whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause prevents certain civil sanctions. Regardless of whe-
ther that analysis is "confusing" or not, if the Double Jeopardy Clause
affords any additional protection for individuals, it mandates enforce-
ment against certain actions by the government if those actions consti-
tute double jeopardy. In other words, the Court cannot refuse to
enforce a constitutional provision, assuming, as the Court did, that it
provides protection not found in other constitutional clauses, simply
because the Court finds the analysis "confusing." Secondly, the
Court's statement that it is confusing to attempt to distinguish
between punitive and nonpunitive statutes is self-contradictory, as,
regardless of whether the as applied approach or the on its face
approach is used, whether a statute is punitive is exactly what is being
100. Id., 522 U.S. at 109-10 (Stevens, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 96, 101.
102. Id. at 102-03.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
105. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S.
483 (1955)).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
107. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103 (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993); Aus-
tin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993)).
108. Id. at 103 (quotations omitted).
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determined. In fact, that is what the Hudson Court did in the remain-
der of the opinion.' Hence, a more realistic interpretation of the
Court's statement is that an as applied approach, as advocated by the
Halper Court, can lead to confusion. This misstatement by the Hud-
son Court is a prime example of careless judicial opinion writing.
The dismissal of Halper by the Hudson Court was an inherently
flawed analysis. The Hudson Court gave three reasons for disavowing
Halper, but each reason suffers from doctrinal, procedural, constitu-
tional, and textual inconsistencies. However, having readopted the
Ward test, the Hudson Court went on to consider the facts of the case
before it, and found that the sanctions imposed by the federal banking
statutes were not criminally punitive. 
110
In Hudson, there were four concurrences with the majority opin-
ion,11' two of which are of some importance to this Comment."' In
his concurrence,"' Justice Stevens criticized the Court for unnecessar-
ily deciding the case on grounds with constitutional consequences," 4
for unnecessarily revisiting Halper,"' for revising its previous decision
in Ursery,116 and for using a procedural double jeopardy issue as one of
the bases for deciding this case." 7 The last two of Justice Stevens'
criticisms support the conclusion stated above that there are some
serious flaws in Hudson's rationale for readopting the Ward test, but
109. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103-05.
110. Id. at 105.
111. Id. at 106,112, 115.
112. Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, restating
his position that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect against multiple punishments at
all, but rather multiple prosecutions only. See id. at 106 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Kurth
Ranch, 511 U.S. at 802-05). Justice Souter also wrote a concurring opinion, in which he warns
that the "clearest proof' standard necessary to override congressional intent of a civil statute is
contextual, and will vary depending on the facts of the case. Id. at 113-14 (Souter, J., concur-
ring). In addition, Justice Souter warned that with the advent of more and more civil penalties,
the clearest proof standard may be easier to reach than it has been in the past. Id. at 114 (Souter,
J., concurring).
113. Id. at 106-12.
114. Specifically, Justice Stevens concluded that Hudson should have been decided on the
grounds of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 107 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).
115. Justice Stevens noted that instead of granting certiorari to consider possible error by
the court of appeals, the Court acknowledged it was concerned about these novel double jeopardy
claims arising in the wake of Halper. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 108-09 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens concluded that these concerns were not as significant as the Court suggested, as
only one case has upheld one of these novel claims. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing E.B. v.
Poritz, 914 F. Supp. 85 (D.N.J. 1996), rev'd sub nom., E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir.
1997)). He therefore concluded that there was no need to revisit Halper, and that the Court's
decision to revisit Halper was "a rather lame excuse for writing a gratuitous essay about punish-
ment." Id. at 110 (Stevens, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 109-10.
117. Id. at 109.
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not necessarily in the decision to adopt the test.118 A more contrasting
concurrence was made by Justice Breyer, in which Justice Ginsburg
joined.119 Justice Breyer rejected the notion that courts are limited to
an on its face evaluation of a statute, instead advocating that the rule
of Halper should still apply and that an as applied approach is pro-
per.' Nevertheless, even adopting an as applied approach, Justice
Breyer found no double jeopardy violation from the facts of Hudson. 2'
One point that was ignored by Justice Breyer, but not by commenta-
tors, 122 is that the majority in Hudson failed to account for the personal
nature of the Double Jeopardy Clause as a protection of individual
rights against the government. Indeed, these "human interests"
seemed to be one of the main rationales behind Halper.
2 1
In sum, even though the Hudson Court reached the correct con-
clusion to readopt an on its face approach,14 it did so for reasons and
with arguments that are vulnerable to attacks on multiple levels. The
distinction between an as applied analysis and an on its face analysis is
too important to be allowed to rest on a weak decision. The United
States Supreme Court should reaffirm its holding in Hudson, but on
different grounds. This opportunity presents itself after the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Young.
D. Young and the Refusal to Follow Hudson
In Young, the double jeopardy issue, as articulated by the Ninth
Circuit, was "whether the Washington [sexually violent predator]
statute violates the ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses of the
United States Constitution, because the statute's effect is puni-
tive...,"12s It is important to remember that the challenge by Young
118. Other commentators have made similar criticisms of the rationale behind Hudson. See
e.g., Troy D. Cahill, Note, The Supreme Court's Decision in Hudson v. United States: One Step
Up and Two Steps Back for Multiple Punishment Protection Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, 33
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 456-58 (1998).
119. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 115 (Breyer, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 116 (Breyer, J., concurring).
121. Id.
122. Cahill, supranote 118, at 457-59.
123. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
124. Other commentators have applauded the results reached by Hudson for various rea-
sons. See e.g., Sardenga, supra note 66, at 146-48 (asserting that an on its face approach is more
reliable and efficient than the as applied analysis of Halper); Amy B. Tate, Recent Development
Case, Hudson v. United States: Imposition of Civil and Criminal Penalties Not an Automatic Vio-
lation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, 28 U. BALT. L.F. 27, 28 (1998) (concluding that the Hudson
decision continues the availability of civil sanctions that promote deterrence).
125. Young, 176 F.3d at 1198 (emphasis added). Young challenged the statute on substan-
tive due process, Ex Post Facto Clause, and Double Jeopardy Clause grounds.
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was to the statute itself, not to its implementation by an official. 26 In
other words, Young was not asking that an official or agency be
enjoined from applying the statute in a certain way. Instead, he
asserted that the statute itself could not be applied at all because the
way in which it was applied amounted to punishment. 127 The Young
court, from the beginning of the opinion and despite the holding of
Hudson, set out to analyze this issue using an as applied approach.
The first sentence of the opinion reads, "[t]his case involves the con-
stitutionality of Washington State's Sexually Violent Predator Statute
as applied to petitioner Andre Brigham Young. "128
There are essentially two arguments the Young court made to
advance its as applied approach and to distinguish itself from Hudson.
The first argument is based on the seminal sexual predator statute
case, Kansas v. Hendricks.'29
In Hendricks, the United States Supreme Court upheld Kansas's
civil commitment statute as nonpunitive, and therefore determined
that it was not in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause or the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 3 ' Because Washington's statute was modeled on,
and is very similar to, the Kansas statute, the Young court conceded
that Washington's statute was facially nonpunitive. 3' The Young
court held, however, that Hendricks did not preclude an as applied
method of analysis, and, in fact, the Young court claimed that both the
majority and concurring opinions in Hendricks looked to conditions of
confinement, and therefore used an as applied approach.'32
126. See Young, 176 F.3d at 1198-99.
127. Seeid.
128. Id. at 1198. See also id. at 1199 ("The linchpin of this case is whether the Washington
statute, as applied to Young, is punitive..."). Therefore, if Young's confinement pursuant to
the Washington statute is punitive, then the statute, as applied to Young, violates the ex post
facto and double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution. Id.
129. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
130. Id. at 367-71. Statutes like the one in Hendricks are an extremely political and emo-
tional issue, thus it was no surprise that the reactions to Hendricks were swift and severe. For
criticism of the decision, see generally Rollman, supra note 4; Andrew D. Campbell, Note, Kansas
v. Hendricks: Absent a Clear Meaning of Punishment, States Are Permitted to Violate Double Jeo-
pardy Clause, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 87 (1998); Jeffrey R. Glovan, Case Note, "I Don't Think
We're in Kansas Anymore, Leroy": Kansas v. Hendricks and the Tragedy of Judicial Restraint, 30
MCGEORGE L. REV. 329 (1999); Hirtz, supra note 4; Beverly Pearman, Note, Kansas v. Hen-
dricks: The Supreme Court's Endorsement of Sexually Violent Predator Statutes Unnecessarily
Expands State Civil Commitment Power, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1973 (1998). For positive treatment,
see Todd M. Grossman, Comment, Kansas v. Hendricks: The Diminishing Role of Treatment in
the Involuntary Civil Confinement of Sexually Dangerous Persons, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 475
(1999).
131. Young, 176 F.3d at 1198.
132. Young, 176 F.3d at 1199 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-63, 367-69, 371).
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This statement by the Young court represents a profound and
inexplicable misreading of Hendricks. In the passages cited by the
Young court,'33 the Hendricks Court only once examines how the stat-
ute in question was actually applied to the committed person, Leroy
Hendricks.'34 The rest of the analysis, dealing with whether the stat-
ute was punitive, makes references time and again to the statute on its
face. 3 The one time the Court delves into the actual conditions of
Hendricks' confinement, its inquiry is regarding the treatment Hen-
dricks received.' 36 The clear holding of this section, however, is that
the act itself, by providing treatment, is rendered nonpunitive:
By furnishing such treatment, the Kansas Legislature has indi-
cated that treatment, if possible, is at least an ancillary goal of the
Act, which easily satisfies any test for deternining that the Act is
not punitive.'37
It is the nature of the statute, not the statute as applied to Hen-
dricks, that is key to the Court's analysis. Even if one were to accept
the Young court's summary of Hendricks as an as applied case,
Hendricks was decided before Hudson, and thus, the Young court
should have been strongly discouraged from engaging in an as applied
analysis.
This leads to the second argument that the Young court made to
rationalize its as applied approach. Young distinguishes Hudson in a
footnote, stating "[w]hereas Hudson involved monetary penalties and
occupational disbarment .... this case involves confinement. In cases
considering the question whether confinement is criminal or civil, the
Supreme Court has always looked to the actual conditions of confine-
ment.""38 This cursory dismissal of the binding Hudson decision is
unjustified on three levels. First, Hudson did involve confinement. 39
Second, the Young court cites three cases 40 to support the view that
the United States Supreme Court has always looked to the actual con-
ditions of confinement to determine whether a statute is civil or crimi-
nal. However, these three cases do not yield the results the Young
133. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-63, 367-69, 371.
134. Id. at 367-68.
135. Id. at 361-69.
136. Id. at 367-68.
137. Id. at 369, n.5 (emphasis added).
138. Young, 176 F.3d at 1199, n.4 (citations omitted).
139. Only on the subsequent criminal indictment, not at the first OCC administrative pro-
ceedings; the defendants in that case were facing possible confinement for their alleged crimes.
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 97-98.
140. Young, 176 F.3d at 1199, n.4 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-67; Allen v. Illinois,
478 U.S. 364, 373-74 (1986); Bell v. Wolfish, 442 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1970)).
[Vol. 24:107
Double Jeopardy and Punishment
court claims, as none of them determine the punitive nature of a stat-
ute as applied to an individual.' Lastly, even if these cases had sup-
ported the Young court's claim, the constitutional protections of
double jeopardy do not change because the punishment being inflicted
is confinement. In other words, the Double Jeopardy Clause should
apply with equal force regardless of whether the second punishment is
confinement; confinement is merely one factor to consider in deter-
mining whether the statute in question is punitive.
142
Confinement has never been dispositive of the proper approach
to take when determining whether a statute is criminally punitive.
Though the Allen court, which considered a sexual predator law simi-
lar to the one in Young, said it "might well be a different case" if the
civil confinement was essentially identical to normal criminal con-
finement without any psychiatric care, Allen still does not stand for the
proposition, as the Young court claimed, that an as applied approach is
always used if confinement is involved in a double jeopardy claim.
143
The holding of Allen clearly relies on an on its face analysis.'44 Even
after stating an as applied approach might be appropriate, the Allen
Court states, "counsel for the State assures us that under Illinois law
sexually dangerous persons must not be treated like ordinary prison-
ers.' Thus, while the Court intermixes an as applied approach and
an on its face approach in one section of the opinion, this does not
change the rest of the opinion, which delves into pure statutory con-
struction and does not support the interpretation of the Young court.
After the panel decision in Young, the State of Washington
moved for a rehearing en banc before the Ninth Circuit. Its motion
was denied.'46 Consequently, the case was remanded to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing on whether the statute, as applied to
Young, was punitive.'47 The Young case presents a prime opportunity
for the United States Supreme Court to make clear why an as applied
approach is impermissible. Specifically, the Court should use the
141. As discussed previously, the analysis in Hendricks was an on its face analysis, with
only slight attention paid to the actual conditions of confinement and even that being tied back
into an on its face analysis. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-67. The court in Allen v. Illinois
examined whether conditions were punitive, but only in the abstract. A careful reading of the
passage cited by the Young court reveals that the Allen Court did not analyze the statute as
applied to the petitioner, but in fact analyzed its objective effects on all inhabitants. See 478 U.S.
at 373-74. The passage cited by the Young court from Bell v. Wolfish likewise has no as applied
confinement analysis; it is entirely an on its face analysis. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-39.
142. See infra pp. 113-14.
143. Allen, 478 U.S. at 377.
144. See id. at 373-74.
145. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
146. Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 1999).
147. Id. at 877.
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Young case to articulate how an as applied approach allows the execu-
tive branch to determine the punitive/nonpunitive nature of a statute
by the way in which it implements a statute. Because of this encroach-
ment into the legislative power, as well as the consequential separation
of powers concerns the as applied approach raises, the United States
Supreme Court should overturn the Ninth Circuit's decision to adopt
an as applied approach in double jeopardy cases and mandate an on its
face approach.
While the United States Supreme Court is the final decision-
maker on separation of powers issues pertaining to the federal consti-
tution, the same is not true for state constitutions. Unlike Halper and
Hudson, Young involves the implementation of a state statute by a state
executive branch, and thus, any separation of powers violations will be
in reference to the Washington State Constitution. Whether the prin-
ciples that the United States Supreme Court should lay out in the
Young case apply to a state constitutional scheme will ultimately be the
decision of the state courts. This does not mean, however, that the
federal courts are precluded from making these kinds of analyses.
Federal courts can still follow the general rule that as applied
approaches allow for unconstitutional as applied vetoes by allowing
executive branches to make a law punitive through their actions in
applying it. Whether this general principle, which should be adopted
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Young, will apply under a certain state's
constitution and render the as applied approach impermissible is a
question of law that changes in each state. However, the federal courts
are capable of making this analysis, and after laying down the general
rule in Young, the United States Supreme Court should either perform
this analysis under the Washington Constitution or remand the case to
the Washington State Supreme Court for its determination of whether
an as applied approach violates the separation of powers principles
incorporated into the Washington Constitution. Either way, the prin-
ciple that must be invoked is the same. An as applied approach
permits a violation of the separation of powers doctrine at both the
state and federal level.
III. THE EVIL OF AN AS APPLIED APPROACH:
SEPARATION OF POWERS
While the separation of powers concerns raised by an as applied
analysis could apply equally to state and federal constitutions, for the
sake of brevity, only the federal Constitution will be considered with
any depth in this Comment. However, the principles that will be
established can easily be transferred to specific state constitutions.
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A. Basic Separation of Powers Principles
Nothing in the Constitution expressly dictates a separation of
powers. Instead, a separation of powers is implicit in the way the
Constitution is structured and in the way it sets out the roles of the
different branches of government. The system of checks and balances
outlined by the framers rests between two extremes. If the checks and
balances are too weak, all the government's power flows to one
branch. 4 ' On the other hand, the checks could stifle the practical
operation of the government, causing it to collapse into "a heap of
ineffectiveness and mutual recrimination."' 49 Mindful of these con-
cerns, the framers set out three branches that they hoped would
achieve the dissemination of power desired without disabling the
workings of an effective government.
For the purposes of this Comment, the most important grant of
power in the Constitution is the veto power granted in Article I, Sec-
tion 7. This power allows the President to veto a bill passed by Con-
gress, which has been given certain legislative powers, 150 and prevents
the bill's enactment into law unless the veto is overridden by a two-
thirds vote of Congress. This veto power is independent and different
from the rest of the "executive power" vested in the President by Arti-
cle II, because the veto power"' uniquely allows the President into the
legislative realm.
The veto has not been the President's sole tool to prevent the
enactment of laws. The President, through executive orders, has over-
ridden laws passed by Congress, but only (properly at least) under the
Property Clause' power. Outside of Property Clause legislation,
148. See PETER M. SHANE AND HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW,
CASES AND MATERIALS 35 (1996).
149. Id.
150. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1.
151. This includes the pocket veto power contained in Article I, Section 7. See The Pocket
Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
152. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915). The precedential value of
Midwest Oil has been consistently expanded beyond its holding. Midwest Oil rests on the princi-
ple that, since the laws passed by Congress were land laws under the Property Clause, they were
not "of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term ... but savor somewhat of mere
rules prescribed by an owner of property." Id. at 474 (citing Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196
U.S. 126 (1905) (quotation marks omitted)). Because the laws involved in Midwest Oil were not
"high" legislation, it was permissible for the executive to override them, especially with a long
history of congressional acquiescence. See id. at 470-74. However, many judges have ignored
this distinction between proprietary laws under the Property Clause, and normal, "high" legisla-
tion under Article I, and have subsequently cited Midwest Oil incorrectly for the proposition that
historical congressional acquiescence allows an executive to override any law. See generally
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) ("In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned... may be treated as a gloss on 'executive power' ...
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however, the federal Constitution limits the President's check on Con-
gress to the veto, the procedural aspects of which are explicitly stated
in Article I, section 7. Adding a de facto as applied veto to this enu-
merated veto power, extends the executive power into legislative
power beyond these carefully prescribed limits, offending the separa-
tion of powers principles of the Constitution. The details of this thesis
are explained in the next subsection.
B. How an As Applied Approach Violates Separation
of Powers Principles
In an on its face approach, a court examines what the legislature
has written and determines the punitive/nonpunitive nature of a stat-
ute from that language. With an as applied approach, the analysis
goes further. An as applied approach examines how a statute is
applied to an individual, but ignores the issue of who does the apply-
ing. Many statutes are administered by an executive agency."5 3 If an
as applied approach is allowed, an otherwise constitutional statute
could be struck down as applied to an individual because of the way an
executive agency administered the statute.
This is an as applied veto. The executive can make a law uncon-
stitutional as applied to an individual through the implementation of
the statute. But unlike other vetoes, the legislature has no binding
means by which to override the executive's application.
Executives incorrectly administer statutes all the time. Why
does this specific double jeopardy issue raise separation of powers con-
cerns? First, when executives implement statutes, normally the puni-
tive/nonpunitive nature of the statute is not legally changed. Second,
the rational remedy for an executive's violation of a constitutional
right is either a lawsuit for damages, assuming no executive immunity,
or an injunction enjoining the executive from continuing to administer
the statute in an unconstitutional manner.' A litigant who argues for
an as applied approach is not asking for these results. Instead, the liti-
gant is asking the court to determine the punitive/nonpunitive nature
of the statue by examining how an executive agency administers the
Such was the case of [Midwest Oil]."); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (cit-
ing Midwest Oil and Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown for the proposition that
acquiescence by Congress can give the president power in that area of acquiescence).
153. In the case of Young, the Washington Sexually Violent Predator Statute is adminis-
tered by the State Department of Social and Health Services, which runs the commitment center
for sexual predators. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060(1) (1994); see also In re Young, 122
Wash. 2d at 12-13, 867 P.2d at 993.
154. Indeed, Richard Turay did get an injunction in federal court forcing the SCC to pro-
vide adequate care and treatment. See Turay v. Weston, No. C91-664WD (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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statute. This is neither a rational nor a constitutional approach, as it
represents an extension of executive power over the legislature because
the executive is allowed to dictate the nature of a law passed by the
legislature.
C. Application to Halper, Hudson, and Young
As mentioned earlier, Andre Young is challenging the constitu-
tionality of Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute as applied
to him."'5 This statute was held to be facially compliant with the
Double Jeopardy Clause by both the Washington Supreme Court5 6
and, in discussing the analogous Kansas statute, the United States
Supreme Court." 7 In passing the statute, the Washington Legislature
specifically mandated that predators who are involuntarily civilly com-
mitted must receive "adequate care and individualized treatment. "158
When one considers the allegations made by Young regarding the
conditions of his confinement (the statute as applied to him), it
becomes clear that he is not attacking the statute as applied to him, but
is in fact attacking the way the statute is being applied."5 9 His com-
plaints are, in effect, that he is not receiving adequate care and indi-
vidualized treatment, even though the statute mandates such care and
treatment. 160
What makes Young remarkable is that the executive is adminis-
tering the statute, either negligently or intentionally, against the man-
date of the statute itself. While this kind of direct disobedience to a
statute is not necessary to invoke a separation of powers rationale for
disavowing an as applied approach, it makes for an even more striking
case that the executive should not be allowed to dictate a statute's con-
stitutionality under the Double Jeopardy clause. Under the Ninth
Circuit's principles in Young, however, this is exactly what could hap-
pen.
It is easy to demonstrate how the Ninth Circuit's holding could
lead to preposterous results. Imagine a civil law requiring drunk driv-
ers, after their criminal punishment, to have their driver's licenses
changed to a special color at their local police station. Imagine also
that the law stated specifically that the police were not to intimidate,
harm, touch, or punish these people in any way. Felon X, after being
convicted of drunk driving, goes down to the police station and gets
155. Young, 176 F.3d at 1198.
156. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 24, 857 P.2d 989, 999 (1993).
157. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371.
158. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090(2).
159. See Young, 176 F.3dat 1200-01.
160. See id.
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beat up by the police. The obvious remedy in this kind of case is
either to sue the police for damages or to get an injunction against the
police, ordering them to not administer the statute in a punitive man-
ner. Under an as applied approach, however, the felon could claim
that, as applied to him, this law is unconstitutional because it violates
his double jeopardy rights and inflicts punishment on him for a second
time. If a court adopted the as applied approach and found that the
statute was applied punitively, the court in this hypothetical would
have to prevent the application of this statute to the defendant. In
other words, the defendant would be released from his obligation to
change his license to a certain color because the law mandating this
color change would be unconstitutionally punitive as applied to him.
This may seem outlandish, but this is exactly what is happening in
Young. The executive branch is violating the mandates of the Wash-
ington Sexually Violent Predator Statute, and the Ninth Circuit is
allowing this violation to dictate the constitutionality of the statute
itself as applied to an individual.
Although the difference between litigating to invalidate the stat-
ute as applied to an individual and suing to prevent unconstitutional
application of the statute by an executive may seem slight, it is in fact
monumental. If courts allow an as applied challenge to a statute and
the statute is found to violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the statute
can no longer be applied. In our hypothetical, the drunk driver would
not have to get his license changed; in a case like Young, the sexual
predator would be released. If courts do not allow an as applied chal-
lenge, the right to litigate remains, but rather than seeking to have the
statute declared unconstitutional, a litigant must sue the executive for
damages, or, assuming immunity, an injunction against administering
the statute in an unconstitutional way. This is the proper way to pro-
tect the "human interests" behind the Double Jeopardy Clause, as
well as to safeguard the legislative domain from an executive's uncon-
stitutional as applied veto.
The Felon X hypothetical demonstrates how an as applied
approach is dubious because it mandates that a statute no longer be
applied at all to a given defendant. However, to further clarify the
separation of powers issue, another hypothetical is useful. Imagine
that the statute in Young (mandating adequate care and treatment) was
passed by the Washington legislature, but was then vetoed by the
Governor. Imagine that the veto was overridden by the legislature,
and the statute became law. Now, imagine a scorned Governor
directing the executive agency that administers the statute to do so in
an unconstitutional way so as to inflict punishment. What is the
[Vol. 24:107
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plaintiffs remedy? With an as applied approach, a litigant can ask
that the court declare the statute unconstitutional as applied to him.
Assuming similar facts pertaining to every individual committed
under the statute, and assuming every individual at the SCC will try to
litigate his or her way out of involuntary commitment, it is not incon-
ceivable that everyone at the SCC could be released if the conditions
of their confinement are deemed punitive. Thus, the law will have
been rendered entirely ineffective-which is exactly what the Gover-
nor wanted when he vetoed the law originally. Although the law
technically remains on the books, the manner in which the executive
has administered the law has, in essence, vetoed the law as applied to
every individual to whom the law applies. This result allows an
executive to side-step normal veto procedures and consequentially
provides for an extension of executive power beyond its prescribed
limits, whether in the United States Constitution, or, by analogy, in a
state constitution.
It is not difficult to see why this creates such a problem in the
sexual predator context when the sexual predator is released. But the
principle of allowing an executive to administer a statute in such a way
as to veto a law applies to most cases where an as applied approach is
used in the double jeopardy context. This can be demonstrated by
reexamining Hudson and Halper in light of the separation of powers
concerns raised by an as applied approach.
Recall that in Hudson, the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (OCC), an executive agency,' first levied civil fines against
three people for various banking law violations."' The government
then indicted the same people for the same acts under federal criminal
statutes.'63  The double jeopardy issue in the case turned upon
whether the initial fine by the OCC was punitive.'64
Under an as applied approach, the court would have determined
the punitive or nonpunitive nature, and thus the constitutionality of
the civil fine, based on whether, as applied to the defendants, the fine
was punitive. Simply put, the OCC could have made the civil federal
banking laws punitive as applied if the fine had been too high. This,
in turn, would have prevented any subsequent criminal penalty.
While the order of the proceedings in Hudson distinguishes it
slightly from Young, the unconstitutional result is the same. In Young,
the assessment of the civil law as punitive makes the civil law inappli-
161. The OCC is actually a bureau of the Department of the Treasury. See <http://www.
occ.treas.gov/AboutOCC.htm> June 27, 2000.
162. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 96-97.
163. See id. at 97-98.
164. Id. at 98.
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cable, whereas in Hudson, a determination that the fine was punitive
would have made the criminal law inapplicable. Though the effected
laws differ, the separation of powers violation remains. In a Hudson-
type scenario, the court would allow the executive's implementation of
civil law to, in effect, veto any similar criminal law that would apply to
an individual.
One might argue that the facts in Hudson, and therefore the
resulting difference in which law (criminal or civil) is affected, do not
raise the same types of separation of powers concerns. This argument
stems from the fact that executive branch officials, namely prosecu-
tors, make discretionary decisions every day as to whether a criminal
law will apply to a defendant. This argument is severely misguided.
When a prosecutor decides not to prosecute, that decision is not
binding. In other words, if the United States Attorney in Hudson
decided not to indict, that decision would not make the criminal law
inapplicable to defendants in the future. It is simply an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, which may or may not be changed as new
evidence arises. When a court allows executive action to change a civil
law into criminal law, however, the consequence is more permanent.
The criminal law can no longer be applied at all due to the Double
Jeopardy Clause's protections. This is not a decision of discretion. It
is an as applied veto that is just as permanent as a normal veto and
cannot be tolerated under our constitutional scheme.
The facts of Halper present an exception to this thesis. Instead
of a situation where an executive applied a statute in such a way as to
make a law punitive, in Halper, the penalty awarded to the govern-
ment was fixed by the civil statute being imposed."' Unlike Young,
and unlike the hypothetical decision of Hudson under an as applied
approach, here the factual issue is not how the executive is applying
the statute, but instead how the fixed penalties imposed by the statute
affect the individual. Because the executive is not acting to change the
nature of the statute in any way, separation of powers concerns are not
raised by the specific facts of Halper. The executive is not operating
with any discretion that could change the legal analysis involving the
nature of the statute.
In instances where an executive's acts do not change the nature of
a statute, is an as applied approach permissible? No. Here is where
the reasons articulated in Hudson come into play. It must be remem-
bered and emphasized that the issue in these cases is whether the
statute being imposed is criminally punitive. For all the reasons artic-
ulated earlier, this is purely an issue of statutory interpretation.
165. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438 (citing the civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31).
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Regardless of how proportionate or disproportionate a fine or judg-
ment may be, the Double Jeopardy Clause's protections are only
invoked by a criminal penalty. The way a law relates to a certain set of
facts should not change the nature of a statute from civil to criminal.
Of course, this begs the question of what role the factual scenario in a
case plays. In other words, should any regard be given to how a stat-
ute applies to an individual?
How a statute impacts an individual can affect the statutory
analysis, but only in a general sense. Recall that the Kennedy factors
are phrased in such a way as to examine a statute in general, not in ref-
erence to any individual case or set of facts. 16 6 What the facts of an
individual case can do, however, is expand the scope of this analysis
beyond what might be obvious from the words of a statute. For ex-
ample, the sixth Kennedy factor examines whether there is an alterna-
tive purpose for the sanction that may be rationally assigned for it
besides punishment, and the seventh considers whether the sanction
appears excessive in relation to that purpose. 167 In Halper, the Court
could have looked at the facts of that case and found that, as a general
matter, the law in question could impose sanctions that appear exces-
sive in relation to the other purposes of the law. The facts could add
up to a possible conclusion about the general properties of the law that
could enter, and even change, the statutory analysis, but again, only in
a general sense. So in Halper, the Court could have looked at the stat-
ute and concluded that, since the fixed statutory penalty will always
apply, and since Medicare frauds are usually for small amounts but at
high frequency, the effect of this law is punitive despite the civil legis-
lative label. The purpose of the analysis in the first place is to deter-
mine if a law is punitive, and even though certain facts may add more
possibilities to consider when looking at the effects of a statute, these
facts should only be construed in relation to the law in general, and
should not mandate or dictate the outcome in a certain case unless
they would do so in all cases.
Some questions remain. First, do not the "human interests"
protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause innately call for an as
applied approach? In other words, the Double Jeopardy Clause pro-
tects an individual's rights, and therefore, the only way to assess those
rights is to look at the facts of the actual case. Second, as applied
approaches are commonly used in many other areas of constitutional
law. What makes them impermissible here and yet permissible in
other constitutional contexts? I will start with the first question.
166. Seeinfra pp. 113-14.
167. See Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
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To best examine the human interests protected by the Double
Jeopardy Clause, it is useful to first recall the three types of abuses the
Clause protects against and then see which branch of government is
limited by the prohibition on those abuses. The first type of abuse is a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. The protec-
tion from this abuse is clearly a limitation on the executive because the
executive has the discretion to decide when to prosecute. Similarly,
the second prohibition, forbidding a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction, is also a limit on the executive for the same
reason. The third prohibition, preventing multiple punishments for
the same offense, constrains the legislature from passing laws that
inflict civil penalties that are, in practicality, criminal punishments.
Indeed, because this third prohibition limits the legislature, it has
raised questions as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause really pro-
tects against multiple punishments at all. 6
An on its face approach is perfectly consistent with the protec-
tions against this third abuse. Since it is a limit on the legislature, the
analysis focuses solely on what the legislature has done. However, an
as applied approach also limits the executive because what the execu-
tive does then determines if the statute is punitive, and thus, applica-
ble to an individual. The problem with extending the third
prohibition on abuse to limit the executive is that the executive is
already limited. The executive, generally, is bound to execute the laws
that are enacted. The human interests protected by this prohibition
against multiple punishments are already protected by the bounds of
(1) the legislature passing a law that is nonpunitive, and (2) the execu-
tive following its mandate to enact the law according to the terms of
the law and the Constitution. An on its face approach secures both
these bounds. A court can either declare that the statute is punitive on
its face, or the litigant can ask the court to enjoin the executive from
applying the law in a punitive manner. Extending the protections of
this third prong of double jeopardy to limit the executive is unneces-
sary, and, as shown above, it enables the executive to use an as applied
veto against the will of the legislature.
168. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 106 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at
798-98 (Scalia, J. dissenting) 'To be put in jeopardy' does not remotely mean 'to be punished,' so
by its terms this provision prohibits, not multiple punishments, but only multiple prosecu-
tions... The view that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit multiple punishments is,
as Justice Frankfurter observed, 'confirmed in history. For legislation... providing two sanc-
tions for the same misconduct, enforceable in separate proceedings, one a conventional prosecu-
tion, and the other a... civil action... was quite common when the Fifth Amendment was
framed by Congress."' Id. (citations omitted)).
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The second question concerns the distinction between an as
applied challenge in the double jeopardy context and other as applied
challenges. It is important to restate what a challenge like this will
claim: because the executive is acting unconstitutionally, this law can-
not be applied. Under a normal as applied challenge the nature of the
law is not the issue. Thus, if the executive administers the statute
unconstitutionally, the litigant can sue to have the executive adminis-
ter it in a constitutional way or to prevent the statute from applying to
the litigant at all. This is the normal type of as applied challenge.
What makes the as applied challenge different in double jeop-
ardy cases is that the issue is not whether the executive is acting puni-
tively within the bounds of the statute, but rather whether the statute
itself is punitive because of the executive's actions. As described ear-
lier, the prohibition against multiple punishments protects individuals
from the legislature passing laws that impose two punishments for the
same offense. The essential question is not whether certain acts are
punitive, but instead whether the law itself is punitive. An as applied
challenge in this context takes the way in which an executive adminis-
ters a statute and uses that as the test to see whether the statute itself is
punitive. A normal as applied challenge does not affect the nature of
the law passed by the legislature, but instead simply judges the actions
of the executive and whether those actions, in and of themselves, are
unconstitutional. The intent and civil or criminal label attached to the
law are not changed by a normal as applied analysis. However, in a
double jeopardy case where the issue is whether the legislature has
passed a criminally punitive law, an as applied approach uses the
executive's actions to change the punitive nature of a law. This is the
essential difference between a normal as applied challenge and the as
applied challenge presented in the Young decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
In examining the last 20 years of double jeopardy jurisprudence,
it becomes clear that determining the punitive nature of a statute is
strictly an on its face analysis. Why that should be the case, however,
is not so clear. Even the decision in Hudson failed to firmly establish
the rationale behind prohibiting as applied challenges. This led to the
decision in Young, which is now ripe for reversal on separation of pow-
ers grounds.
The United States Supreme Court should use the Young case to
lay out the true principles that make an as applied challenge constitu-
tionally impermissible-mainly that it violates the separation of pow-
ers doctrine. This would firm up the Court's own jurisprudence in
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this area. Under the approach advocated here, mistakes such as those
made by the Young court could no longer occur, and in the future,
statutes would always have their punitive or nonpunitive nature
determined by the legislature, not by the acts or omissions of the
executive.
